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Codifying Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.
Ronald D. Rotunda*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Court has long acknowledged, due process leaves "matters of kinship,
personal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest," to "legislative
discretion," not constitutional law.' A host of statutes, rules of court, professional
codes, and regulations create various grounds that require judicial
disqualification.
Nonetheless, while due process limitations are few, they do exist. Before
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,' due process mandated judicial
disqualification in two basic situations:4 first, when the judge had a direct,
personal, and substantial pecuniary interest in the case, or second, when the judge
acted as judge, jury, prosecutor, and complaining witness, and there was no need
for an instant response.' Caperton adds a third category.
The facts of the Caperton case and its holding are deceptively simple to
summarize, at least initially. As the majority pithily explains, there was a dispute
between the two companies.6 The trial court entered a jury verdict of $50 million
against Massey, and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed (3 to
2).7 The U.S. Supreme Court's majority opinion claimed that Chief Justice
Benjamin (who was in the majority of the West Virginia Supreme Court), "had
received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and through
the efforts of, the board chairman and principal officer of the corporation [Don
Blankenship] found liable for the damages."' That, said the U.S. Supreme Court,
meant that Benjamin's refusal to recuse himself violated due process.9
* The Doy & Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence Chapman University
School of Law.
1. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (citing Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266, 270 (1884)).
2. E.g., Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) ("Of course, most questions concerning a judge's
qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard." (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,
475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986))).
3. 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009). For further analysis, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification
in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247 (2010).
4. 129 S. Ct. at 2267.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008).
8. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. CL at 2256-57 (emphasis added). The PAC (political
action committee) of A.T. Massey Coal Company also contributed $1,000 to Benjamin's campaign. Massey
Coal Company itself gave no money to either candidate. Id.
9. Id. at 2257 ("in all the circumstances of this case, due process requires recusal").
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This summary of Caperton is deceptive for two reasons. First, Justice
Benjamin did not receive "extraordinary" contributionso from Blankenship.
Existing statutes already impose limits on campaign contributions," and
Blankenship complied with those statutes. Hence, there was nothing
extraordinary about them. In Caperton, the Court later conceded that
Blankenship only contributed the statutory maximum of $1,000 to Benjamin's
campaign.12 If the problem was the excessive contribution, existing statutes
already took care of that.
The second reason this summary is deceptive is because the problem the
majority identifies is not Blankenship's contribution-his $1,000 donation was
insignificant-but Blankenship's independent expenditures, which were
sizeable." The expenditures are "independent" because, as discussed below, the
individual who makes them does not coordinate these amounts with the
candidate. Indeed, the candidate has no control over what the individual says,
how he says it, how much he spends, when he spends it, or where he spends it.14
Hence, Caperton creates this third constitutional category that requires
judicial recusal: sometimes, a judge must disqualify himself because an
individual-who is not a lawyer or party before the Court but who has an interest
in a case that is before the court-made independent campaign expenditures that
may have benefited the sitting judge in securing his election.'5 The question is:
when does "sometimes" occur? And, what exactly was Blankenship's interest in
the case? We know that he is not a party, but the Court does not pursue the line
of inquiry except to say that Blankenship was interested in the case.
10. Id. at 2256 ("The basis for the motion was that the justice had received campaign contributions in an
extraordinary amount. . . .").
11. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualhfication in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 247, 258 (2010) (discussing the limit in West Virginia).
12. 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
13. "Independent expenditures" are amounts that an individual spends to attack or embrace a candidate
for judicial office.
14. Blankenship spent a large amount of money in connection with this election but only made a $1,000
contribution to Benjamin's campaign:
Other than a $1,000 direct contribution from Blankenship, Justice Benjamin and his campaign had
no control over how this money was spent. Campaigns go to great lengths to develop precise
messages and strategies. An insensitive or ham-handed ad campaign by an independent third party
might distort the campaign's message or cause a backlash against the candidate, even though the
candidate was not responsible for the ads. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam)
("Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive"); see also Brief for Conference of
Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae 27, n. 50 (citing examples of judicial elections in which
independent expenditures backfired and hurt the candidate's campaign).
Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
15. 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64.
16. E.g., Brief of Petitioners, 2008 WL 5433361, *3 ("Mr. Blankenship's extraordinary efforts on behalf
of Justice Benjamin's campaign - undertaken when Mr. Blankenship was preparing to appeal a judgment of
great personal and professional significance [to him]"); id. at *17 (Blankenship "has a strong personal and
professional interest in the outcome of this case - which created a compelling reason for Justice Benjamin to
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The answer to these questions is not nearly as neat or as simple as one might
think. The majority described the facts and holding of Caperton as follows:
In this case the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed a
trial court judgment, which had entered a jury verdict of $50 million.
Five justices heard the case, and the vote to reverse was 3 to 2. The
question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was violated when one of the justices in the majority denied
a recusal motion. The basis for the motion was that the justice had
received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and
through the efforts of, the board chairman and principal officer of the
corporation found liable for the damages."
The news media replicated the majority's summary of the case. For example,
a New York Times editorial rhapsodized:
Indeed, the only truly alarming thing about [the Caperton] decision was
that it was not unanimous. The case drew an unusual array of friend-of-
court briefs from across the political spectrum, and such an extreme case
about an ethical matter that should transcend ideology should have united
all nine justices.18
The editorial further notes, "Chief Justice Roberts is fond of likening a
judge's role to that of a baseball umpire" and "[i]t is hard to imagine that
professional baseball or its fans would trust the fairness of an umpire who
accepted $3 million from one of the teams."'9 Given this description of the case,
the result should be obvious. Yet, four justices dissented. 20 The dissenters
appeared to reject the common sense notion that there is judicial bias when-
"without ... the consent [of the other parties]-a man chooses the judge in his
own cause."2' After all, the umpire should not accept $3 million from one of the
teams before calling strikes and fouls.
The dissenters, however, did not argue that one party to a controversy should
choose the judge to decide the dispute. They dissented because they did not
believe the majority when it said the "justice had received campaign
contributions.",2 Indeed, even the majority ends up conceding that the board
repay his debt of gratitude to Mr. Blankenship by casting the deciding vote in Massey's favor."); 129 S.Ct. at
2262 (Caperton argues that "Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his
extraordinary efforts to get him elected"); 129 S.Ct. at 2270-71 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (repeatedly referring
to the "interest" to the individual making the expenditures).
17. Id. at 2256-57 (emphasis added).
18. Editorial, Honest Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A22.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 129 S.Ct. at 2265-2267 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 2256-57 (emphasis added).
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chairman (Don Blankenship) did not give any large contribution to Justice
Benjamin. Instead, Blankenship spent a lot of his money attacking the incumbent,
Chief Justice Warren McGraw. Mr. Blankenship had no personal financial
interest in the case, or at least no interest (even if one would pierce the corporate
veil) that was anywhere near the $3 million he spent to attack Justice McGraw."
A. Contributions versus Expenditures
Blankenship's "independent expenditures" paid for a steady stream of
advertisements that attacked Justice McGraw, but no party argued that
Blankenship in any way coordinated with Benjamin's campaign. These
expenditures were truly independent. Blankenship spent "over $500,000 on
independent expenditures-for direct mailings and letters soliciting donations as
well as television and newspaper advertisements"-attacking McGraw. He was
the prime funder (almost $2.5 million of Blankenship's money) behind an
independent entity called And For The Sake Of The Kids (ASK) (a political
organization dedicated to opposing McGraw).4 Blankenship focused like a laser
beam on attacking McGraw,25 and because there were only two candidates in the
race, Benjamin was the one who benefited.
The dissenters believed, with justification, that the Court must treat
independent expenditures differently than contributions. This distinction between
"contributions" (giving money to, or spending money that is coordinated with,
23. Id. at 2273-74 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 2257. As the news reported at the time, "And For The Sake Of The Kids," was dedicated to
opposing McGraw:
The group has been running ads assailing McGraw's vote in a 3-2 court edict that reinstated
probation for convicted child rapist Tony Dean Arbaugh. While on probation, Arbaugh, once
charged with assaulting 11 children, some as young as 4, violated conditions and even pleaded guilty
to smuggling marijuana into a regional jail. McGraw's campaign manager, A.V. Gallagher, pointed
out the donation by Blankenship alone is six times the amount the incumbent justice has received for
the general election.... "Warren McGraw says he's for the 'working man,' but he's not,"
Blankenship said in a statement. "He's for trial lawyers and he's for himself. His brother (Attorney
General) Darrell McGraw buys what is clearly campaign material with thousands of dollars of public
money."
Mannix Porterfield, For the Sake of Kids Gets $2.5 Million, Mostly Massey Cash, THE REGISTER-
HERALD, Oct. 15, 2004, available at http://www.wvcag.org/news/fair_use/2004/10 _15.htm (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
Commentators have also complained that "And For the Sake of the Kids," was a front to oust incumbent
Supreme Court Justice Warren McGraw by linking him to his "ruling regarding a child molester released from
prison." Diane Mufson, Blankenship, Massey Could Have Funded New School, THE HERALD-DISPATCH, May
12, 2010, available at http://www.herald-dispatch.com/opinions/x540217122/Diane-Mufson-Blankenship-
Massey-could-have-funded-new-school (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
25. Blankenship has even commented that his real purpose was to defeat McGraw. See, e.g., Adam
Liptak, Case May Alter Judge Elections Across Country, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/02/15/washington/15scotus.html?_r-l&ref=washington (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
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the candidate) and "expenditures" (spending one's own money to advocate what
26one feels like advocating) is hardly technical. It is of constitutional dimension.
The Court has long protected independent expenditures-those not
21 2coordinated with the candidate-as free speech. "Money talks."28 In contrast,
the state has much greater leeway in regulating and limiting contributions.29
"Advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less
entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political
policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation."'o
Blankenship was exercising his core First Amendment speech when he paid for
the attack-advertisements against Justice McGraw, the sitting justice whom
Benjamin defeated.
As recently as 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
Justice Kennedy-the same Justice Kennedy who authored Caperton-
emphasized the importance of independent expenditures." Citizens United held
that a federal statute prohibiting a corporation's independent expenditures for
electioneering communications violated the First Amendment.32 Blankenship was
exercising a core constitutional right when he criticized McGraw and urged
voters to reject the incumbent. Thus, the Court in Caperton holds that due
process clause required Benjamin to disqualify himself because Blankenship was
exercising his First Amendment rights under Citizens United."
The state could not ban Blankenship's independent expenditures anymore
than it could ban any political activist from purchasing a megaphone so that the
crowd can hear his message more clearly.34 Activists who have more money-
e.g., Ross Perot-can buy expensive television commercials to propagate their
views. Those of us who do not have deep pockets-e.g., pockets not as deep as
those of Mayor Bloomberg of New York"-may not use the government to
26. 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 20.51 (4th ed. 2008).
27. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976)."Unlike contributions, such independent
expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove
counterproductive." Id. at 47; see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Elections, Campaign Financing, and Free
Speech, 2 ELECTION L. J. 79 (2003).
28. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). MARTIN H. REDISH,
MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 114-46 (2001).
29. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. Id. at 48 (footnote omitted).
31. 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
32. Id. at 886.
33. Even the ABA has noticed the interplay between Citizens United and Caperton. MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT intro, p. 2 ( Discussion Draft 2010). See Appendix A.
34. 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 20.5 1(b)(i), (b)(iii), (b)(v), (c)(ii), (d)(viii) (4th ed. 2008).
35. Michael Bloomberg's campaign treasury totaled more than $85 million, which was a "national
record for a personally financed campaign." Henry Goldman, Bloomberg Wins Third NYC Mayor Term, Beats
Comptroller Thompson, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a0sKk
IZlDr-w (on file with the McGeroge Law Review).
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silence the millionaire because our resources are less. The idea that
"government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.""
Not only was Blankenship exercising core free speech when he made his
independent expenditures, but there was little that either Justice McGraw, or his
challenger, Brent Benjamin, could do about it. Justice Benjamin could not control
Blankenship's independent expenditure because Blankenship made those
decisions independent of Benjamin. Benjamin could not limit or affect what
Blankenship was saying, even if he disagreed with the style and tone of the
Blankenship message. Of course, there was nothing that McGraw could do to
control Blankenship either. The only thing that Justice Benjamin could control
was the $1,000 that Blankenship gave to Benjamin's campaign.3
Neither A.T. Massey Coal Company (nor any of its subsidiaries) contributed
any money to Benjamin's campaign, nor made any independent expenditure of
funds that either supported Benjamin or criticized his opponent. Nor did Massey
or any of its subsidiaries provide any money to support the nonprofit entity
ASK, 9 the organization that Blankenship funded from his personal funds. ASK
also published attack-advertisements against McGraw, and Benjamin's campaign
had no control over that either, even if the message of those advertisements did
not fit the message that Benjamin was seeking to distribute. "Campaigns go to
great lengths to develop precise messages and strategies. An insensitive or ham-
handed ad campaign by an independent third party might distort the campaign's
message or cause a backlash against the candidate, even though the candidate
was not responsible for the ads."40
In his opinion, Justice Kennedy never explains why the Court blurred the
distinction between contributions and expenditures. All we know is that Kennedy
acknowledges (and he only does so once) that Blankenship engaged in
"independent expenditures." 4' But then, a dozen times he repeatedly re-labels
these "independent expenditures" as "contributions."42 Justice Kennedy discusses
36. See Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008) (invalidating a federal statute that
eased the spending restrictions for non-self-financed candidates if he or she spent in excess of $350,000 of his
or her own money).
37. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
38. Joint Appendix, Vol. I at 208a, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-
22), 2008 WL 5784213 (showing Benjamin for Supreme Court Committee, State of West Virginia Campaign
Financial Statement (Long Form) in Relation to 2004 Election Year).
39. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009) (ASK was established under 26
U.S.C. § 527(e)).
40. Id. at 2273 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2257.
42. See id. at 2256-57 ("[Tihe justice had received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount
from, and through the efforts of, the board chairman .... ) (emphasis added); id. at 2257 ("Blankenship's $3
million in contributions .... ) (emphasis added); idL at 2263 ("Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or
attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a judge's recusal .... ) (emphasis added); id. at 2264 ("The
inquiry centers on the contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the
100
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the precedent in disqualification cases, and quotes the relevant portions of those
cases as referring to "contributions" to the judge, 4 not independent expenditures.
Yet, he treats the two concepts, "contributions to the Judge Benjamin's
campaign" and "independent expenditures attacking McGraw," as synonymous,
without explaining why. Nor does he ever suggest that, in the future, the Court
will treat independent expenditures the same as contributions. Indeed, a year after
Caperton, the Court in Citizens United, in an opinion that Kennedy authored,
reemphasized the distinction between contributions and expenditures.4
Blankenship's independent expenditures against McGraw were hardly
unusual for him. Blankenship is an activist, daresay an eccentric, who has often
made independent expenditures to support his favored causes in West Virginia
elections on issues entirely unrelated to Massey. "For example, Blankenship
spent millions of dollars of his own money to unseat candidates who opposed
abolishing the state sales tax on food.45 He also spent millions of dollars to defeat
a bond referendum." 46
II. THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF BLANKENSHIP AND HIS ROLE IN THE
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN
Caperton does not reject the earlier (and later) distinction between
contributions and expenditures. 7 Instead, it says that this case has something
more-a combination of factors that require disqualification. The Court
considered "all the circumstances of this case" and concluded that "due process
campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome
of the election.") (emphasis added); id. ("Blankenship contributed some $3 million to unseat the incumbent and
replace him with Benjamin. His contributions eclipsed the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters
and exceeded by 300% the amount spent by Benjamin's campaign committee.") (emphasis added); id.
("Whether Blankenship's campaign contributions were a necessary and sufficient cause of Benjamin's victory
is not the proper inquiry.") (emphasis added); id. ("Blankenship's campaign contributions-in comparison to
the total amount contributed to the campaign . . . .") (emphasis added); id. ("The temporal relationship between
the campaign contributions, the justice's election, and the pendency of the case is also critical.") (emphasis
added); id. ("when the campaign contributions were made") (emphasis added); id. at 2265 ("Although there is
no allegation of a quid pro quo agreement, the fact remains that Blankenship's extraordinary contributions were
made . . . .") (emphasis removed) (second emphasis added); id. at 2266 ("[Slome states require recusal based on
campaign contributions . . . ."); see also id. at 2265 ("The parties point to no other instance involving judicial
campaign contributions that presents a potential for bias comparable to the circumstances in this case.") This
last comment is intriguing. Of course the parties point to no other case-there is no precedent because Justice
Kennedy created the rule for the first time in this case. One could just as well say, there is no precedent
supporting Caperton's position. That is a fact of life, not a reason why petitioner should win.
43. Id. at 2260 (citing Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972)).
44. 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
45. Brief for Respondents at 6, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009
WL 216165.
46. Id.
47. 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE &
PROCEDURE § 20.5 1(b) (4th ed. 2008).
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requires recusal" because the "probability of actual bias on the part of the judge
or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."48
Justice Kennedy thought Caperton was an "extreme" case, and under it
disqualification would be limited to "rare instances."49 This case is "extreme by
any measure."o This is "an exceptional case."" This is "an extraordinary
situation" that "requires recusal."52 No other instance "would present a potential
for bias comparable to the circumstances in is case."" One must apparently look
at "all the circumstances of this case." 4 Let us look at these circumstances.
Justice Kennedy said it was significant that Blankenship had a "personal
stake" in this particular case. This is an important factor for the Court, but
Kennedy does not explain why it is true. He simply accepted-without
discussion-the proposition that this case meant a lot to Blankenship because of
Blankenship's financial stake in the outcome.56 It is true that Blankenship was a
principle officer of Massey (he was the Chairman, CEO, and President),
however his ownership/financial interest was minor." Blankenship is a wealthy
man, but he was not anywhere near becoming a controlling stockholder in
Massey. In fact, he owned only 0.35% of Massey's stock.
If we were to pierce the corporate veil and pretend that the proportional share
of Caperton's damage claim against Massey would come directly out of
Blankenship's personal wallet, Blankenship's share of the judgment in this
case-assuming that Massey was liable-would be only $175,000.0 If
Blankenship really thought he could buy a judge, he was not getting much value
for his money. It makes little economic sense for Blankenship to spend $3
48. 129 S.Ct. at 2257 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). However, Withrow only said
that the probability of actual bias on the part of judge or a decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable if the decision-maker has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, or if he or she has been the
target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him or her. Id. Those factors were not part of
Caperton.
49. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265-67.
50. Id. at 2265.
51. Id. at 2263.
52. Id. at 2265.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2257.
55. Id. at 2263-64
56. Id. at 2265.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2257.
59. Brief for Respondents, at 5, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009
WL 216165.
60. See id. Compare MASSEY ENERGY CO., QUARTERLY REPORT (FORM 10-Q) (Nov. 7, 2008),
available at http://secfilings.com/searchresultswide.aspxTablndex=2&FilinglD=235842&type=convpdf&
companyid=1 1418&ppu=%2fdefault.aspx%3fticker%3d%26amp%3bname%3dmassey%2benergy%26amp%3b
formgroupid%3d2%26amp%3bauth%3dl (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (85.1 million shares
outstanding), with STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP (FORM 4) (Nov. 18, 2008) (296,935
shares owned by Blankenship).
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million of his own money for a chance to save $175,000. Perhaps Mr.
Blankenship was emotionally tied to this case-an emotion divorced from
rationality-but that was not Justice Kennedy's point. Kennedy simply asserts
that Blankenship was financially tied to this case."' He did not explain
Blankenship's interest, and as the above equation illustrates, the cold calculus of
finances does not explain Blankenship's interest it either.
Prior to Caperton, Justice Benjamin decided other cases involving Massey
Coal. Notably, none of the parties to those cases asked for Benjamin to recuse
himself. Hence he participated in those decisions and often ruled against
Massey.62 Even after Caperton was decided, Justice Benjamin ruled against
Massey in other cases. For example, shortly after the West Virginia Supreme
Court decided Caperton, Justice Benjamin voted to deny review in another case,
leaving a $243 million verdict standing against Massey. The $50 million verdict
against Massey in Caperton was a very large amount to be sure, but it paled in
comparison to the $243 million that Justice Benjamin approved in the other case,
where no one raised a disqualification motion.
One might argue that Justice Benjamin did not cast the deciding vote in the
other case, but that he did in Caperton. However, the validity of any
disqualification motion cannot turn on whether the judge will cast the deciding
vote after oral argument and after the judges' deliberation. Parties have to make
their disqualification motion before the judges decide. The law does not allow
litigants to see how things work out before they file their motion, because the
disqualified judge is not even supposed to participate in the deliberations. As
Justice Blackmun explained in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, a case
involving the disqualification of another judge:
[T]he constitutional violation in this case should not depend on the
Court's apparent belief that Justice Embry cast the deciding vote-a
factual assumption that may be incorrect and, to my mind, should be
irrelevant to the Court's analysis. For me, Justice Embry's mere
participation in the shared enterprise of appellate decisionmaking-
whether or not he ultimately wrote, or even joined, the Alabama
Supreme Court's opinion-posed an unacceptable danger of subtly
distorting the decisionmaking process.
61. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265 ("the fact remains that Blankenship's extraordinary contributions
were made at a time when he had a vested stake in the outcome") (emphasis added).
62. See U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Helton, 631 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 2005); Helton v. Reed, 638 S.E.2d 160
(W. Va. 2006) (where Justice Benjamin voted against Massey companies at the merits stage); see also McNeely
v. Independence Coal Co., No. 042156 (W. Va. Feb. 9, 2005); Brown v. Rawl Sales & Processing Co., No. 06-
1700, (W. Va. Sept. 7, 2007) (where he ruled against Massey at the petition stage).
63. Brief for Respondents, at 9, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 216165.
64. 475 U.S. 813, 831 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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In Caperton, Justice Kennedy also said it was important that Blankenship
"had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case
by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was
pending or imminent."5 We know that Blankenship had no influence in directing
the judge's election campaign. Presumably, Kennedy meant that Blankenship's
independent expenditures were crucial, or at least important, in securing Justice
Benjamin's election.
Justice Kennedy stressed that the judicial election was "decided by fewer
than 50,000 votes."6 Granted, 50,000 votes is a narrow victory in a well-
populated state like California, but it is not so in West Virginia. Justice Benjamin
beat McGraw by 53.3% to 46.7%.67 Thus, he won the election by 6.6 percentage
points! That is not a close election. Consider, for example, that in the 2008
election, President Obama enjoyed what many commentators called a landslide.5
Yet only 52.87% of the voters picked Obama.69
Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent, disputed Justice Kennedy's assumption
that Blankenship's expenditures were all that important to Justice Benjamin.
"Many observers believed that Justice Benjamin's opponent doomed his
candidacy by giving a well-publicized speech that made several curious
allegations; this speech was described in the local media as 'deeply disturbing'
and worse."70
Roberts was much too kind. He does not mention the substance of the
speech, but one can easily find discussions in the West Virginia newspapers.
McGraw gave his strange stump speech on Labor Day of 2004, shortly before the
November election. Unfortunately for him, someone tape recorded it. McGraw
said, for example, his opponents "tell you that members of my party have
opposed school prayer. False! Not so! It's the Republican Party!" He also
proclaimed "not more than six months ago, the United States Supreme Court
approved gay marriage! Not Democrats!"7' The speech became known as "The
65. 129 S.Ct. at 2263-64.
66. Id. at 2264.
67. Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
68. See Andrew Keen, Obama's Landslide Will Throw Up Conservative Bloggers, The INDEPENDENT,
Nov. 10, 2008, at 54, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/medialonline/andrew-keen-obamar
squos-landslide-will-throw-up-conservative-bloggers-1005317.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
Shaun Mullen, The Barack Obama Landslide and Leading America Out of the Wilderness, MODERATE VOICE,
Nov. 5, 2008, available at http://themoderatevoice.com/24085/the-barack-obama-landslide-leading-america-
out-of-the-wilderness (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
69. Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, 2008 Presidential General Election Results,
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
70. Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
71. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 302 n.35 (W. Va. 2008) (Benjamin, C..J.,
concurring) (emphasis added). To hear it yourself, visit: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQ 6nQaE2FM8
(last visited Dec. 31, 2009).
104
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 42
72Scream at Racine." As the GOP rebroadcasted it repeatedly, Justice McGraw's
own words undercut him.
III. CONCLUSION: CREATING A RULE TO IMPLEMENT THE DISQUALIFICATION
TEST OF CAPERTON
As we analyze Caperton carefully, we learn that it is difficult to divine or
discern a test to determine when due process requires disqualification in a case
that is similar to, but not exactly like, Caperton. We know the Court will
disqualify a judge on constitutional grounds if five members decide that the facts
are "extreme." And in making the determination, as an "objective matter," that a
person who was not a party (but was interested in a case) should not "choo[se]
the judge in his own cause,"3 the five members will not distinguish between
campaign expenditures and independent campaign contributions. What else the
Court will consider, however, is something left to future cases. Granted, not all
legal tests have the nice precision of a diamond jeweler's scale.74 Still, the
Supreme Court should be able to offer judges a better test than "it all depends" in
deciding whether the judge must recuse himself as a matter of constitutional law.
What we do know is that, as a matter of due process, excessive contributions
or excessive independent expenditures may require judges to recuse themselves
when a party (or a party's lawyer) objects. This was the case in Caperton, even
though Mr. Blankenship had a free speech right to spend-even squander-his
own money in the form of independent expenditures.
Caperton also does not say that the decision on the merits must come out
differently. The Supreme Court merely remanded the case to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals.7 Justice Benjamin recused himself, and another West
Virginia judge sat in his place by special designation. The West Virginia Court,
once again, overturned (4 to 1) the $50 million judgment against Massey Coal.76
So, after all of the litigation, the case ended up exactly where it was before the
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed it.
Inevitably, lawyers in the future will want to know when they should move
to disqualify under Caperton, and judges will want to know when they should
grant such a motion. Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion is short
on specifics.
72. Scott Finn, Caperton v. Massey: What a Long, Strange Case it's Been, W. VA. PUB. BROAD
CASTING, June 9, 2009, available at http://www.wvpubcast.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=9955 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
73. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265-66 (emphasis added).
74. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the Proposed New ABA
Judicial Code, 34 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1337, 1342-43 (2006).
75. Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2267.
76. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 2009).
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Although he purported to talk of objective and reasonable perception, the
opinion offered no objective test:
We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias-based on
objective and reasonable perceptions-when a person with a personal
stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. The inquiry
centers on the contribution's relative size in comparison to the total
amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in
the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the
outcome of the election."
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that "sometimes no administrable standard
may be available" to determine when the judge should disqualify herself.7' He
also repeatedly emphasized that this case was unusual, "extreme by any
measure,"79 "exceptional,"'o and "an extraordinary situation"' requiring recusal.
No other instance, he suggested, would "present a potential for bias comparable
to the circumstances in this case."82 So the majority suggests that the case will not
lead to a flurry of recusal motions. But whether this prediction is true will depend
on how lower courts interpret it.
We should try to create a rule that codifies Caperton, so judges have fair
warning of when they must recuse themselves. This effort is likely to be fruitless.
Expensive judicial campaigns are troublesome, and Caperton is one effort of the
Court to limit what many people see as the corrosive effects of judicial campaign
financing.83 Yet, it is hard to create a bright-line rule that requires a judge to
recuse himself when independent expenditures (which the judge has no control
over) become excessive.
In Caperton, Justice Kennedy concluded that under all the circumstances,
Blankenship's "pivotal role in getting Justice Benjamin elected" meant that
Justice Benjamin would "feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his
extraordinary efforts to get him elected."" This "debt of gratitude" test is no more
77. Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2263-64.
78. Id. at 2265.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2263.
81. Id. at 2265.
82. Id.
83. See James Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 295
(2010) ("The improper appearance created by money in judicial elections is one of the most important issues
facing our judicial system today.").
84. 129 S.Ct. at 2262.
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refined than a rule that says the judge must disqualify herself when the case is
"extreme by any measure."" As Blankenship told one interviewer:
"I've been around West Virginia long enough to know that politicians
don't stay bought, particularly ones that are going to be in office for 12
years," he said, referring to the terms of State Supreme Court justices.
"So I would never go out and spend money to try to gain favor with a
politician. Eliminating a bad politician makes sense. Electing somebody
hoping he's going to be in your favor doesn't make any sense at all."
West Virginia Supreme Court terms are twelve years. Why would Justice
Benjamin tilt this one case to favor Blankenship after his election, when
everyone knows (1) there will not be another election for a dozen years, (2) no
one knows now whether Benjamin would run for reelection, (3) Benjamin, if he
decided to run again, may not need the support of Blankenship in the next
election, and (4) neither Benjamin nor Blankenship may even be alive in twelve
years? Blankenship's reaction is exemplified by Henry Adams' epigram, "a
friend in power is a friend lost.""
Caperton, like any vague decision, raises many questions, and this "debt of
gratitude" rationale is a doozy. If, as Justice Kennedy argues, independent
expenditures create a "debt of gratitude"" in the judge who benefits from the
expenditures, what if there is a debt of ingratitude? For example, if Justice
Benjamin had lost and his opponent had won, must that opponent recuse himself
because the opponent would feel animosity or ingratitude against Blankenship?
Commentators typically think of Caperton as affecting judicial campaign
financing, and so it may. But as the discussion of "debt of gratitude" shows,
gratitude does not have to be limited to campaign contributions or independent
expenditures. The Caperton Court may well learn, over the coming years, that
the rather vague test in that case will leak into the appointed judiciary.
The test of gratitude may well invite or even require a great number of
judicial disqualifications of Article III judges. President Richard Nixon appointed
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Powell-all of whom did not
hesitate to rule against him in United States v. Nixon." Justice Breyer and Justice
Ginsburg participated in Clinton v. Jones, although Clinton had appointed both of
85. Id. at 2265.
86. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Case May Alter Judge Elections Across Country, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/washington/15scotus.html?_r-l&ref=washington.
87. Henry Adams, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 94 (1999).
88. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262.
89. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Nixon also appointed Justice Rehnquist, who disqualified himself for a
different reason (his friendship with Attorney General Mitchell). Later, Rehnquist joined the majority in Nixon
v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 731 (1982). Along with Powell who wrote the majority opinion, Burger concurred.
Blackman, yet another Nixon appointee, dissented. Nixon appointed Burger, Blackmun, Powell, & Rehnquist. 6
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE,
471 476, 477 (4th ed. 2008).
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them.90 Both ruled against Clinton, with Justice Ginsburg joining the majority and
Justice Breyer concurring in the judgment. If they had a disqualifying "debt of
gratitude," they surely did not show it. Yet, after Caperton, should these justices
have rethought their participation? Future litigants may seek to disqualify federal
judges because of a possible debt of gratitude to a senator or mentor, who was
important in securing their appointment, or to the President who appointed them.
The present ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct has no disqualification
rule dealing with a "debt of gratitude." It does, however, have Model Rule
2.11(A)(4), which deals with contributions to judicial campaigns" but not with
independent expenditures (i.e., amounts that an individual spends to attack or
embrace a candidate for judicial office). So, Rule 2.11(A)(4) would not have
affected the disqualification in Caperton even if West Virginia had adopted the
ABA Rule. In fact, it has been a full decade since the ABA proposed Model Rule
2.11 (A)(4), and since that time not a single state has adopted it.92 It is, however, a
bright-line rule that is easily understood and enforced.
The relevant ABA Committee has tried its hand in developing language to
codify the Caperton rule but has found it difficult. One tentative proposal offers
this language for a new Rule 2.1 l(A)(4):
The judge knows or learns by means of disclosures mandated by law or a
timely motion that contributions to the judge's campaign [,or to the
campaign of an opponent whom the judge defeated in the election,] in an
amount that [is greater than $ [insert amount] for an individual or $[insert
amount] for an entity] [is reasonable and appropriate for an individual or
an entity] have been made by donors associated or affiliated with a party
or counsel appearing before the court, unless a waiver is agreed to by all
other parties in accordance with the provisions of this Rule.93
The purpose of this section is to strengthen the existing ABA Model Judicial
Code, Rule 2.11(A)(4). However, the reluctance of states to adopt the existing
version of Rule 2.11(A)(4) does not augur well for the prospects of a stronger
version. Moreover, this proposed new version does not deal with the problem of
Caperton, because one version does not cover independent expenditures, and no
version offers an objective test.
If this proposed rule were extended to independent expenditures-if Justice
Benjamin had lost the election and the other candidate, the incumbent, Justice
Warren McGraw, had won-this new rule would guarantee that Blankenship
could disqualify McGraw. That would have the perverse result of increasing the
90. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
91. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.1 1(A)(4); see also id. at R.4.4(A)(2), Comment 3.
92. Appendix A at 16. Alabama has a provision governing campaign contributions that predated ABA
Model Rule 2.11(A)(4). ALA. CODE §§ 12-24-1, 12-24-2 (2006). Mississippi also has a provision, although it is
not a codification of the ABA Model Rule. MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT canon 3E(2) (2008).
93. See Appendix A at 7.
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incentives of activists to spend money in judicial campaigns. These activists,
even if they were unsuccessful in seating their favorite candidate, would be
successful in disqualifying the candidate who won. It is a win-win situation for
well-heeled litigants who want to disqualify a particular judge-just contribute to
his opponent, and whoever wins must disqualify himself (one, because of a debt
of gratitude and the other because of a debt of ingratitude).
The ABA has alternative versions of the Model Judicial Rule that do refer to
"independent expenditures." 94 However, like Caperton itself, the ABA offers no
rule; it simply offers issues the judge should consider-"a non-exclusive list of
factors to be considered by the judge in determining whether disqualification is
appropriate in the campaign support context."5 The ABA actually argues that "a
non-exclusive list of factors" the judge should consider in deciding whether to
disqualify himself will actually be "helpful"," but this list is not helpful because
it is just a list, and a nonexclusive one to boot.
If the ABA decides to promote one of its versions that include restrictions on
independent expenditures, as in Caperton, then the new rule would require
disqualification even though the judge cannot control those expenditures. After
all, these expenditures are, by hypothesis, "independent." The proposed ABA
rule has no provision allowing judges to disavow the views of the person or
group engaged in independent expenditures.
The final answer may be that there is no way to codify Caperton. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in response to Caperton, examined that case and
decided not to codify it. 9 Indeed, Wisconsin did the opposite: it adopted a rule
that explicitly provides that endorsements, campaign contributions, and
independently run advertisements in themselves are not enough to force a judge's
recusal.'
Every future Justice Benjamin would like a clear rule. To the extent that
there is a bright-line test (or at least a test that approaches a bright line), judges
will follow it. Litigants will know when to file their motions. Indeed, if the line is
bright enough, judges can recuse themselves sua sponte.
In addition, the brighter line reduces the transaction costs for litigants and for
judges. Judges can follow the rules without worry that a higher court, after
weighing all the factors, will conclude, months or years later, that the judge was
unethical in not recusing himself. Instead, the ABA offers "more nuanced
variants" that will make it more difficult for judges to follow the rule because the
rule is: "it all depends."
94. Appendix A at 8, 10, 14, & 18.
95. Appendix A at 18.
96. Appendix A at 19.
97. Patrick Marley, State High Court Says Campaign Donations Can't Force Recusals, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Oct. 28, 2009, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/67012672.html (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
98. Id.
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Granted, it is not easy to draft a litmus test to determine disqualification. In
some cases, such a test may be unusually difficult. Caperton looks like it falls in
that category. It is never easy to systematize the law. In the case of Caperton, it is
simply impossible.
Appendix A: STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE WORKING
GROUP ON JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (ABA, Mar.10, 2010 Discussion Draft):
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STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
WORKING GROUP ON JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Introduction
Since 2007, the ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence ("SCJI") has been
working on a project to survey disqualification rules and practices around the country,
particularly in the state courts, to identify problems and uncertainties that arise under existing
regimes, and, where appropriate, to propose reforms. The Judicial Disqualifiation Project
("JDP") conducted research and circulated in 2009 draft recommendations and re t Ilanguage
primarily within the ABA but also to certain outside entities wit ia strong interest iii the area
(such as the Conference of Chief Justices). Certain conerns and reservations were expressed
with respect to some aspects of the report language and some of the proposed recommendations.
Relatively contemporaneously, two decsionis of the U.S. Supreme Court, one on June 8, 2009
and the other on January 21, 2010, have intervened and have significantly altered the landscape
ofjudicial disqualification in the context ofjudicial election campaign support.
In Caperton v. A. T Iasw Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court
held, based on, limited by, and subject to its rather "extreme facts," that refusal of a West
Virginia high court judge to grant a miotion to disqualify in the face of financial support for his
campaign in excess of $3 million from the CEO of a party created a "serious, objective risk of
actual bias" that was constitutionally intolerable. Id. at 2265. The Court extolled the Model
Code and the state' adoption thereof as maintaining the integrity of the judiciary and the rule of
law. Id. at 2266 Noting that "the due process clause demarks only the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualifications," id. at 2267, the Court observed that "States may choose to 'adopt
stanlards more rigorous than due process requires."' Id., quoting Republican Party ofMinn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) and citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520
U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (distinguishing the "constitutional floor" from the ceiling set "by common
law, statute, or the professiona standards of the bench and bar").
The Court quoted with approval the 1990 ABA Model Code's objective standard
enjoining judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. Caperton, 129 S. Ct.
at 2266 (citing Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 14 & n. 29). The Court
also quoted with approval the brief amicus curiae of the Conference of Chief Justices, which
underscored that the state codes of judicial conduct are "the principal safeguard against judicial
campaign abuses" that threaten to imperil "public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the
nation's elected judges." Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266 (quoting Brief for Conference of Chief
Justices as Amicus Curiae 4, 11).
SCJI Proposed Amendments to 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct - Page 1
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Caperton thus strongly signals the importance, both to the states and to public
perceptions of the judiciary in general, of having rules in state judicial codes that can contain the
mischief of excessive campaign support in judicial elections. That importance has increased
exponentially in the wake of the Court's even more recent decision in Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 2010 WL 183856 (U.S. Sup. Ct., No. 08-205, Jan. 21, 2010). There the Court
held that statutory limitations on independent campaign expenditures by corporations and labor
unions violated the First Amendment. The case did not concern judicial elections; rather it
involved restrictions on the dissemination and showing, during the presidential campaign
primaries leading up to the November 2008 general election. of a documentary entitled "Hillary:
The Movie." As a consequence of this decision, corporations and labor unions will be able to
make unlimited expenditures not only in general elections but in judicial elections as well. The
mere possibility that a vast influx of additional campaign money might enter the latterarena,
which already in the past decade has been saturated with unprecedented campaign support,
virulent attack ads, and concomitant diminution in public respect for state judiciaries, makes
tighter controls over disqualification imperative in cases where parties have provided significant
financial support.
In the wake of these developments, SC constituted a new Working Group to take a
fresh look at the JDP and to propose new recommendations. As part of that effort, the Working
Group has focused on Rule 2.11 of the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007) (the "Model
Code"). Having heard that the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
(SCEPR) is considering revisions to other parts of the Model Code, SCJI has reached out to
SCEPR to suggest collaboration on possible revisions to the Model Code. While focusing
primarily on the text and commentary to Rule 2.11, the Working Group noted possible
improvements to other provisions in Canons 2 and 3 of the Model Code; these are offered here
for SCEPR's consideration as welt.
We are aware of the enormous amount of effort put forth by SCEPR and the ABA's
Center for Professional Responsibility on the 2007 version of the Model Code. Nothing in this
document shoutld be regarded as in any way diminishing or depreciating the value and
significance of that effort. The Working Group believes, however, that the landscape of
campaign support in judicial elections (some form of which take place in 39 of the 50 states) has
dramatically changed in the wake of the Caperton and Citizens United decisions. That
transmogrification, especially when conjoined with the enormous additional influx of campaign
support in judicial elections during the past decade, has considerably raised the stakes for state
judiciaries in terms of judicial independence and public perception of the integrity, impartiality,
fairness - and, indeed, the legitimacy - of the judicial branch of government. The ABA has
traditionally taken the leading role in providing guidance to the states on matters of judicial
ethics and judicial conduct, and it is in that spirit that the following proposed revisions to the
Model Code are being offered.
SCJI Proposed Amendments to 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct - Page 2
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* * * *
What follows are the Working Group's suggested revisions to the Model Code. The
format employed herein uses redlining and strikeout features to display the proposed changes to
certain of the Rules in Canons 2 and 3 and, where applicable, the Comments accompanying the
Rules. After each rule, additional explanatory text will summarize the rationale behind the
proposed revisions.
We welcome all comments and suggestions on this draft. We request that any such
comments and suggestions be submitted -- referring to particular page and line numbers to
facilitate our consideration thereof- in writing to the Working Group's Reporter, at the e-mail
address furnished at the conclusion of this document, on or before April 2, 2010.
Terminology
Amendmentts to Text
1 "Affiliate" and "aflAtedd" mcan o misn h oa or. t ion that iontrols, i
2 contolled by, or is d otornrtn controllingersoni
3 "A: ocht" anL~toitdfnen i osnwo em-ploys, is emiployed by, or is
4 cade aonyo mlymn xitaohipisnoy pcrsoo who acts in cooperation,
5 coiuiloo ocrtwtn ttetqet of, -Another person: and any spoose domestic
6 pinr tpro stu h hddiisot ic ln p oay m fi the foregoing.
7 "Cnrl o cntied" each tefeis to the powxet ofone person to cxercise. directly
8 or iniectiv or thosf m or more persons, a doinin g .o~ng u otoln.nlec
9 over another person, whetlr by contractual relationship (including without limitation a debtor-
10 creditor relationship), by family relationship, by ownership, dominion over, or power to vote any
11 category or voting interest (including without limitation shares of cominon stock, shares of
SCJI Proposed Amendments to 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct - Page 3
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12 voting preferred stock, and partnership interests), or by exercising (or wielding the power to
13 exercise) in any manner doninion over a majority of directors, partners, trustees, or other
14 persons performing similar fnctions.
15 "Person" means any natural ojuridical person including withuut hmitaton any
16 corporation., limited liability company, partoneisup, trustomon or oiler labor organization; any
17 branch, division, department or local unit of any of the foragll ani political cOnrlutee, party,
18 or organization; or any other organization or group of peson
Amendments to Commentary
Not applicable.
Explanation of Proposed Changes
Two new terms, "Affiliate"/"affiliated" and "Associatc"/"associated," are being proposed
in order to give the broadest reach possible to the description in Rule 2.11 of those who provide
campaign support in judicial elections. The purpose of these definitions is to prevent such
supporters from avoiding or evading the potential judicial disqualification consequences of their
support by resort to such simple expedients as the use of various types of business associates and
affiliated persons to disguise or conceal the identity of the supporter or the purpose of the
campaign support. Definitions of two additional, ancillary terms, "Control"/"controlled" and
"Person," were added in order to explicate and flesh out the content of the first two terms in a
manner that would avoid making any of these definitions overly cumbersome.
Rule 2.10 Judicial Statements on Pending or Impending Cases
Amendments to Text
1 (A) A judge shall not make any public statement that might reasonably be expected to
SCJI Proposed Amendments to 2007Model Code of Judicial Conduct - Page 4
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2 affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending nimattcr* or impending& matter* in
3 any court, or any nonpublic statement that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or
4 hearing.
5 (B) A judge shall not, in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely
6 to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the
7 impartial* performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.
8 (C) A judge shall require court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge's
9 direction and control to refrain from making statements that the judge would be prohibited from
10 making by paragraphs (A) or (B).
11 (D) Notwithstanding the restrictions in paragraph (A), a judge may-make-publie
12 statementsinthecourseof efficial duties, may explain court procedures, and may comment on
13 any proceeding in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity.
14 (E) Subject to the requirements of paragraph (A), a judge may respond directly or




Explanation of Proposed Changes
Minor language changes to Paragraph (A) are intended as a housekeeping amendment, to
make the language track precisely, rather than paraphrase, the terms of art used in the
Terminology section.
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The proposed amendment to paragraph (D) is substantive. As currently drafted, the
"public statements" clause of paragraph (D) renders nugatory the ukase in paragraph (A) against
a judge making public statements that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of, or
impair the fairness of, any pending matter or impending matter. The impartiality of a judge
making any such public statement might reasonably be questioned within the meaning of Rule
2.11(A) or might create an appearance of impropriety sufficient, in either event, to require the
judge's disqualification from presiding (in the case of an impending matter) or presiding further
(in the case of a pending matter) over the proceedings. Nothing itt the commentary
accompanying Rule 2.10 explains the otherwise inexplicable phenomenon of paragraph (A)
giving with one hand and paragraph (D) taking away with the other. The Standing Committee
on Judicial Independence believes the simplest approach is to delete the inexplicable phrase from
paragraph (D) rather than try to come up with a way of qualifying or conditioning it.
Rule 2.11 Disqualification
Amendments to Text
1 (A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's
2 impartiality* might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following
3 circumstances:
4 (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's
5 lawyer, or has personal knowledge* of facts that are in dispute in the
6 proceeding.
7 (2) The judge knows* that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner,*
8 ef a person within the third degree of relationship* to either of them, Of
9 the spouse or domestic partner of such a person, or a person in association
10 _i honh o j Judge praceed law within the preceding three years Istates
11 are fire to vary this time period], is:
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(a) a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, general partner,
managing member, or trustee of a party;
(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(c) a person who has more than a de minimis* interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding; or
(d) likely to be a material witnes in the proceeding.
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary,* or the
judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of
the judge's family residing in the judge's household,* has an economic
interest* in the subject matter in controversy or is a party to the
proceeding.
(4) The judge knows or learns by means of aicle a by lawo
a timely motion that a party, a pa-y's lawyer, or the law firm of ap
kwyr hs wthi th prvios [nset nmbe] yar~] mdeaggregate*
contrfiutions* to the judge's campaign[. or to the campaign of an
op ponent whoJnahe udge deteated in the election,] in an amount that [is
greater than $ [insert amount] for an individual or $[insert amount] for an
entity] [is reasonable and appropriate for an individual or an entity] have
been made by donors associated* or affiliated* with a party or counsel
appearing before the court, unless a waiver is agreed to by all other parties
in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
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33 VARIANT 1: The judge knows or learns by means of disclosures
34 mandated by law* or a timely motion that aggregate* contributions* to the
35 judge's canpaignf, or to the campaign of an opponent whom the judge
36 defeated in the election, in an amount reatrin V000 tintdidual
37 states ae free to vaes this dollar amount] base de made by donors
38 associated or affliated* with a party orcounse 'ppcating hefore the
39 count unless a an eri aged to by all other partics in aecodane with
40 the provisions of this Rule In deten g sbehe disquai ation (with
41 or without motion) is ippwpriate uidqr th pagraph. the iactors to be
42 considered should incude mqk a/i
43 Ta he level of support genhrectlyo indirectl, by a litigant in
44 i baon oth to aggregate support (direct and indirect) for the
45 Iinnitta judge s [or >ppooent s] carnpaen and to the total
46 aunt spent hr al andhdaies for tnajudgeship.
47 (t) It the suppoit is monetar, whehe any distinction between
48 dret conb i uns or uidepeidetexpendiues ears on the
49 dtquaineatkii questioti.
50 (e) The tining of the support in ulation to the ease for
51 which disqualification is sought;
52 (d) If the supporter is not a litigant, the relationship, if any.
53 between the supporter and (i) any of the litigants, (ii) the issue
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54 before the court, (iii) the judicial candidate [or opponent], and (iv)
55 the total support received by the judicial candidate [or opponent]
56 and the total support received by all candidates for that judgeship.
57 VARI N1 2: The judge knows orms by means of disclosures
58 mandated by law* or a timely motion tha tceontributions* to the
59 judge's campaign[, or to the ennain of an opponet vshnm the judge
60 defeated in the electin in an nount gret than
61 Lption : percent idiinra(tater fre to p efy this
62 percentagl f all such coniribiito the judge's [or opponent's]
63 canpaig o
64 Opon. peent ix iual Se a efree to specify this
65 pewcutage of all c tributions to all canidates ftr that judicial
66 poma n durn ;t canwpai, or
67 CAA00 per [ndi idal states are tree to specify this
68 percenage of all such contribunions to the judge's [or opponent's]
69 d..paign n  perei [individual statesare free to specify this
70 ercentage] of all contributions to al candidates for that judicial
71 position duing the campaign
72 have been made by donors associated* or affiliated* with a party or
73 counsel appearing before the court, unless a waiver is agreed to by all
74 other parties in accordance with the provisions of this Rule. In
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75 determining whether disqualification (with or without motion) is
76 appropriate under this paragraph, the factors to be considered should
77 include, inter alia:
78 (a) If the support is monetary, whetr nan odistion between
79 direct contrintions or indepenent xpendimes b ars on the
80 disqhaificaion quan ton:
81 (b) he tinn of the suppo l iation to th c Ors o
82 whish disqualification i t
83 (C) If t Ipportr is rt altign le lati onship if any,
84 Loi eon the uppotte aid (i any ot teligants (ii) de issue
85 oohe i. oit and ii e voua ndidatc or opponent] and
86 the toa ppoi reci cl by rh judicial carididat for
87 >ppornntj arid th e tol sport rocen e h andidates for that
88 inuesfup
89 (5) The judge, while ajudge or ajudicial candidate,* has made a public
90 statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion,
91 that comnmits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or
92 ule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy.
93 (6) The judge:
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94 (a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated
95 with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the
96 matter during such association;
97 (b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity
98 participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public
99 official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in
100 such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
101 matter in controversy;
102 (c) was a material witness concerning the matter;
103 (d) previously resided as ajudge over the matter in another court.
104 (7) A iaoion to disqualy has been ied in which a party or a las yer
105 )epreaning aparty m the proceeding has brought to the judle's atteitioi.
106 and the judge does nut contest, that the judge hIs, in conneclio with the
107 roceed o controverts la d the requirern:ts of the foregoing
108 prevsins ol this paragraph or of Rule 23, 1A. 20 .8(B) 2,9. or 10.
109 VARINt. A motion to d&iqualil\ has been tiled on behalf of a
110 virl to the proeeding by a law yer who has subitted a sworn afidavit
111 alleng tat the judge has, in connectio with theproeeding or
112 cotr oversy, violated the requirements of the foregoing provisions of this
113 paragraph orot Rule 2. 2. 26 28(B) 29, on 10t
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114 (B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic
115 interests- and shall make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic
116 interests of the judge's spouse or domestic partner and miner-ehildfen members of the judge's
117 family who reside residing in the judge's household.
118 (C) Any motion to disqualif the judge. or the appeal fro the denial of such a
119 motion, shall be decided promptly after all papers relatu4 to the moon, or bie on appeal,
120 have been filed, or the time for filing such pape or briefs under applicable la]s has elapsed,
121 whichever occurs first. Denials of disqualieaton moions, end decsions on appeals therefrom,
122 should be in writing or otherwise on the record and should set bah the reasons tot the decision.
123 (D) A judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice
124 under paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record the basih of the judge's disqualification and
125 may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court
126 personnel, whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and
127 lawyers agree; without participation by the judge or court personnel, that the judge should not be
128 disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated
129 into the record of the proceeding.
Amendments to Commentary
1 [4] The fact tha ya lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a
2 relative of the judge is affiliated does not itself disqualify the judge. If, however, the judge's
3 impartiality might reasonably be questioned under paragraph (A), or the relative is known by the
4 judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be substantially affected by the proceeding
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5 under paragraph (A)(2)(c), the judge's disqualification is required. Similarly, if the judge within
6 the preceding three years [states are free to vary this time frame] practiced law in association
7 with a person who is involved in the case in one of the capacities enumerated in paragraph 2(a)
8 through (d) th juge's disqualification is required; wshere such pro- soa association took
9 place more than three years presiously, disqualification is di onay n should be analyzed
10 under the general standard of whether the judge's inra e mght asouni be guestioned,
11 [lie distinction between this proisiotn and paragrh f a) i that the lae (Wl ith e judge's
12 prior association with a lawyer in the case ung the iof that aocion (e pror to the
13 judieial sersvice) whereas this provisioni dde wii a lawyer inob n the Vise not during the
14 prior association but witin a elatively he od of ne see he po ss iation with the
15 judge ended Moreover, a the anag ot uh make ler tse hack letter provisions are
16 not, intended to he cctieanceanohrrltonships stwh as a, close and longstanding
17 peisonal fr-iend ofti eothhedaep Jtc at ind might fall swithin the appeaiance of
18 imartialt aiad
19
20 [5] A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties
21 or their lawyers might reasoably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification,
22 even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification. To assist judges in ful iling this
23 obligation, courts should promulgate rules requiring parties and their counsel to disclose
24 corporate and other business organization affiliations and, in those states in which judges face
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25 some kind of election, details of campaign contributions and independent expenditures made to
26 support the election campaign of any judge before whom they are appearing [or the judge's
27 opponent] by any party or counsel, or any of their affiliates or associates.
28
29 1n71 Since paaraph (A)(4) was adede to e (ode ilfi ns have
30 become signiticanitly mote contentious, and caintysitn supr i itmsd expueniallsv. To
31 aie thea ippearano of partiality or i irness i e problerma tn. t
32 identified by the U.S. Supremo rtu iii Cay op n v, 1, 1eu(' Co., 129 ', 12t52
33 wi2)t paragraph tAtft mandate.n dise to otii, in states whitdge face Some siri of
34 election, whni camnpaign suppr fo . ug loo uiag o or the e lectin campaign
35 oa iiopponent wlwo td ug ebte t h lcin rmdnr associated or affiliated
36 csidt a part or cof re ti Re.ose a sua chvieanl, tbe appiopriate
37 S CI P osed be Amenmntste C ehode Jdictiaonl oudges to baseadequat
38 infb'otn inodtt ,unV t ti piopt iaie edisetosurtic trim caint atan stuporteis
39 utdrs1 ttteo idttu tile atecessrx. in pies eni litigants from "ganting" the
40 s'stemi by itiai- eentiiiu prcsel in order tot be able to disequafits p titiular judges. the
41 atnis specifheel by eihtrs"ction thottled be higyh enougih to discotnagte such bettavitot, aite
42 the other parties to ri poceeding weill htave the abilits to s xis e lisejstafin.ation in iccor dance
43 with the provisions; of ths rule. In oider to prosvide the States stb a mienu of choices wshent
44 considering adopioin of this Rile.. two varits have also been proposed. Variant I uses a
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45 partiular dollar amount as the trigger for disqualification, while Variant 2 uses a percentage as
46 the trigger and offers three alternative options; each variant also enutnerates a set of factors
47 wiuch aru not xclusive but -whicl should be consideted in detorminin (ahthe Or not te
48 dcterninutiou is prompted by moto it disqualification is approfsial
49 tim In order not to enlarge unduly the length and time pe r tio seecsions on
50 disqr isfication issuet should be both incaningiul and tht sates ou should has e in
51 place procedure) fur intcerloc.utory res je, of a. dena !taiois o dssquatl enaso
52 miotions to disqubliey. and decisions o aptheie f u be render as quickly
53 as possible atier the motion or the appea C eease ma he p vl d all such decisions
54 should b1 95 (sritpg Or otinsise of die re., criticiing rti Bxlack for steisons dir the
55 decision lecisiom solunparine to 20cyears beore grThaispraoisionr isbtinu need not
56 containar o explana oghe contereout ad jget decide in f exercise of
57 disciretion. to Pt 05 id uh neplnl
B irnatio of Proposed Changes
p r i 2c.1 I tA2 6d by adding language to cover a lawyer involved in a
case pendiPg before the cout ith whom thejudge had been professionally associated a short
time before the judge had been eilevated to the bench. The time period selected was three years,
but there is no mic to that numtber, and it is contemplated that states could use this as a menu
option where each jisi-diction would be free to specify the time frame it felt most appropriate
with respect to the pnrin association. Cf Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 328 U.S.
161, 897 (1945) (septite opinion of Jackson, J., criticizing Justice Black for sitting on a case
argued by his former law partner of 20 years before).** This provision is being suggested in
L/ For a roughly contemporaneous, and sympathetic, discussion of Black's
participation in the case by one of his former law clerks, see generally John P. Frank,
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order to fill a gap left by 2.11 (A)(6)(a), which covers a lawyer with whom the judge practiced
represented the party during the period when that lawyer and the judge were associated, but does
not cover the situation where that same lawyer represents the party now, rather than then. The
concern here is not so much that the judge might be privy to nonpublic information about the
party (as might be perceived to be the case in the (6)(a) situation), rather that the judge might be
perceived as being less than completely impartial toward a lawyer (and, hy extension, that
lawyer's client) with whom the judge was recently associated. The passage of time would allay
such concerns, however. For that reason, three years is being suggested as the cutoff, though, as
noted, each jurisdiction is free to specify a longer or shorter time frame. Explanatory language
has also been added to Comment 4. The suggestion that similar situations might exist was added
to the comment language rather than to the rule (the example chosen is a lawyer with whom the
judge had no prior professional association but who is a close and longstanding friend or the
spouse of such a friend.
Rule 2.1 1(A)(4) in its present form was added to the Model Code in 1999 to address
concerns about threats to the appearance of fairness and impartiality posed by campaign finance
in judicial elections. Today, over a decade letter, not a single state has adopted this Rule, and
only two states, Alabama and Mississippi, have adopted provisions to address this particular
concern (Alabama's provision actually antedated Rule 2.11(A)(4)). ALA.CODE §§12-24-1, 12-
24-2 (2006); MISS.CODE OF IUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 31E(2) (2008).
Preliminarily, neither the Working Group nor SCJI as a whole finds anything wrong with
the approach of the existing rule. With respect to the text of the existing rule, however, the
Working Group has offered some suggested revisions in order to clarify that disqualification may
be just as necessary when the judge's (unsuccessful) opponent received substantial campaign
support from a litigant or counsel now before the judge as when it was received by the judge's
own campaign. At oral argument in the Caperton case, the latter was referred to by several of
the Justices in questioning Massey's counsel about the concept of a "debt of gratitude." See e.g.,
Transcript of Oral Argument 38-39, 43-45, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252
(2009) (No. 08-22), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral argument/argument transcripts/08-22.pdf (The former
could then be, and in post-Caperton discussions has been, referred to as a "debt of hostility").
Conceptually due process would logically require disqualification for disproportionate campaign
opposition just as with disproportionate campaign support. If that is so, it seems only sensible
for the Model Code to provide for both.
Disqualification ofJudges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947). See also Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-
Jackson Feud, 1988 S. CT. REV. 203, 208 (1988).
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There is an antecedent question concerning how a judge would know about campaign
support for an opponent unless it had been in the form of virulent attack ads with attribution, e.g.,
"Paid for by the United Mine Workers"(to borrow the example used by Chief Justice Roberts
during oral argument in Caperton) or state law were to require disclosures by supporters that
were then made publicly available or, at a minimum, available to the candidates. In the wake
of Caperton and Citizens United, judges will, at a minimum, need to have access to more
information in order to be able to make appropriate campaign support disclosures in the cases
over which they preside, and donors who are parties or are associated or affiliated with parties
before the court (including counsel) must be required to make their own disclosures on the
record. (This can be accomplished either by statutory provisions in state election laws or by
rules of court, similar to existing court rules mandating disclosures of corporate alffiliations,
support for filing of briefs amicus curiae, etc.) Anticipating this, the Working Groulp has
proposed inserting the phrase "disclosures mandated by law or" before "a timely motion" in the
first clause of the Rule.
Moreover, the Working Group has proposed more expansive language that would replace
the former formulation, " a party, a party's lawyer, or the law firm of a party's lawyer" with
"donors associated or affiliated with a party or coiisel appearing befre the court." The
intention here is to foreclose efforts to evade the Rule by funneling different contributions
through affiliated or associated donors. The proposed language make use of the proposed new
defined terms (see above) and hopes to capture all campaign support made by entities within a
corporate complex, intlding those from individual directors, officers, employees, consultants,
and other agents (and family members of the foregoing), and to accomplish a similar objective as
to counsel appearing in the case by capturing support from their law firms, subsidiaries or
affiliates of their law firms, and individual attorneys associated with any of them (along with
family members). Suggested language on this topic has also been added to Comment 5.
We have also suggested the elimination of language limiting the concept of disqualifying
support to donations made within a specified number of years prior to the case coming before the
judge. If the support was sufficiently substantial, the passage of time alone will not necessarily
eliminate the taint of partiality or unfairness in public perception. (Recall also the Robert
Jackson-Hugo Black feud). The Working Group believes that the ability of other parties to
-***/ In West Virginia, for example, Don Blankenship, the Chairman and CEO of
Massey Coal, had to fill out a financial disclosure form on which it says "Expenditures made to
Support or Oppose"; Blankenship underlined the word "Support" and typed in the words "Brent
Benjamin." Argument Transcript, supra, at 8; see also Joint App. 188a, Caperton v. Massey,
129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 5784213.
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waive disqualification in these circumstances is adequate protection against over-disqualification
and avoids the arbitrariness of any chronological cut-off.
Though the existing Rule, particularly as revised, seems eminently reasonable, the
Working Group and SCJI believe that the ABA must face up to the uncomfortable reality that no
state has adopted it. Given that reality, two variants on Rule 2.11 (A)(4) are being proposed to
supplement, not to supplant, the existing version. The purpose of these variants is to provide
each State in which judges at any level are subject to any form of election with a menu of options
in crafting a rule suitable for its particular circumstances.
The proposed Variant 1 on Rule 2.1 1(A)(4) once again expressly contemplates
disclosures of campaign support by parties and counsel in accordance with applicable "law,"
which, as used in the Terminology section, comprehends both statutory law and rules of court. A
judge who knows (or learns as a result of the aforementioned disclosures or a disqualification
motion) that the judge's campaign, or that of the judge's opponent during the campaign, received
more than a specified dollar amount of support from donors associated or affiliated with a party
or counsel appearing before the court, must withdraw from the case, subject to the ability of the
parties to waive disqualification. The variant offers $25,000 as a suggested dollar amount on the
theory that it is neither too low to attract "gaming" of the system by unscrupulous lawyers or
litigants who wish to preserve the option to disqualify a judge they don't like nor too high in
terms of public perceptions of whether a judge has been "bought."
Variant 1 also incorporatcs a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered by the judge in
determining whether disqualification is appropriate in the campaign support context. These
factors were adapted from the brief amius curiae of the Conference of Chief Justices in the
Caperion case, which were referred to from time to time at oral argument. They include:
(a) The level of support given, directly or indirectly, by a litigant in
relation both to aggregate support (direct and indirect) for the
individual judge's [or opponent's] campaign and to the total
amount spent by all candidates for that judgeship;
(b) If the support is monetary, whether any distinction between
direct contributions or independent expenditures bears on the
disqualification question;
(c) The timing of the support in relation to the case for which
disqualification is sought;
See Argument Transcript, supra, at 24 (Alito, J.), 46 (Breyer, J.), 52 (Stevens, J.).
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(d) If the supporter is not a litigant, the relationship, if any,
between the supporter and (i) any of the litigants, (ii) the issue
before the court, (iii) the judicial candidate [or opponent], and (iv)
the total support received by the judicial candidate [or opponent]
and the total support received by all candidates for that judgeship.
Variant 2 adopts a similar approach but, instead of prescribing a dollar amount as the
trigger for disqualification, substitutes a percentage. Three different options are offered for
choosing a percentage: (1) a percentage of total support for the judge's campaign (or that of the
judge's opponent); (2) a percentage of total support for all cndidates for that judicial position; or
(3) a combination of (1) and (2). Variant 2, like Variant 1, also incorporates a non-exclusive list
of factors to be considered by the judge in determining whether disqualification is appropriate in
the campaign support context.
Proposed language on the subject of this variant has been suggested for a new Comment
7 to Rule 2.11.
The Working Group believes that having these slightly more nuanced variants as
alternatives to the simplicity of pre-existing Rule 2.1 (A)(4) will be helpful to the States and
will, as noted above, provide them with something of a menu from which to craft provisions
suitable to their particulat circumstances.
A new Rule 2.11(A)(7). proposed in two alternate versions, is intended to address what
appears to be an inaWertent lacuna in the Model Code. Canon 2 is replete with provisions
regulating judicial conduect, but nothing is said about the consequences of failing to abide by any
of those provisions. As is well known, state judicial conduct commissions exist to address
complaints brought against judges, including complaints containing allegations of violations of
the Model Code. In addition, Iowever, some (though not all) of the provisions in Canon 2 refer
to circumstances in which disqualification would be appropriate. The provisions in question are
expressly noted in both versions of the proposed rule: Rules 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, 2.8(B), 2.9, 2.10, and
2.11(A)(1)-(6).
Often, these sorts of violations are unintentional or inadvertent, and, in the press of court
business, the judge may not even be aware that a possible violation has taken place. Proposed
Rule 2.11(A)(7) provides that where a motion to disqualify brings this situation to the judge's
attention, and the judge does not contest the factual allegations in the motion, then the judge
should grant the motion withdraw from the case. What happens, however, if the judge does
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contest the factual predicate for the motion? A variant on this provision is being offered that
would require the judge to accept as true any such factual allegations offered as a sworn affidavit
of counsel accompanying the disqualification motion. In those circumstances, assuming the
affidavit is legally sufficient and the motion is timely filed and otherwise meets such procedural
requirements as are imposed on such motions under applicable law, then the judge must grant the
motion. The Working Group believes the latter variant is the better approach, as it provides a
much cleaner procedure. Such a procedure is already in use in several states The risk of
attorney abuse is small, since if the facts alleged in the affidavit are false, the judge, despite
having had to disqualify himself or herself from the case in question, can still make a referral to
bar disciplinary authorities.
Minor revisions have been proposed to Rule 2.11 (B). The Working Group sees no reason
why the judge's duty to make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic
interests of others residing in his or her household should be limited to minor children but should
be extended to any member of the judge's f'aily who resides in the judge's household. (N.B.
Under the language of the Rule, the judge's duty to be informed appears to apply to a spouse or
domestic partner regardless of whether that person resides in the judge's household; we see no
reason to alter that).
A new Rule 2.11(C) has been proposed. A hfundational principle of the Working
Group's approach to the JDP is that rulings on disqualification motions must be both meaningful
and prompt. The proposed Rule addresses both, First, it requires a prompt decision on a
disqualification motki and on an appeal from the denial of a disqualification motion. "Justice
delayed is justice denied." This requirement is an appropriate addition to the Model Code
inasmuch as it places an affirmative obligation upon judges to address an issue that is absolutely
fundamental to both the appearance and reality of a judge's fairness and impartiality, the default
proposition of Rule 2.11(A). Second, in the event a motion to disqualify has been denied, the
See, e.g., COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-6-2; COLO. R. Civ. P. R.97; COLO. R.
CRIM. P. R.21(b); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. 63-1; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 38.10; FLA. R. JuD, ADMIN.
R.2.330; GA. SUPER. CT. R. 25.3; MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-805. See also Goebel v. Benton,
830 P.2d 995 (Colo.1992); Birt v. State, 350 S.E.2d 241, 242 (Ga.1986). Cf N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 15A-1223; State v. Poole, 289 S.E.2d 335, 343 (N.C.1982) (trial judge presented with
disqualification motion should "either recuse himself or refer a recusal motion to another judge if
there is 'sufficient force in the allegations contained in [the] motion to proceed to find facts.')
(quoting North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Gillespie, 230 S.E.2d 375, 380 (N.C.1976)).
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proposed Rule requires that an explanation therefor be provided either in a written decision or
otherwise on the record; the same requirement would apply to decisions on appeals from such
denials. Such written explanations would not only enrich the law of judicial disqualification but,
more importantly, would over time provide firmer guidance to judges who have to apply
disqualification rules to novel factual settings.
Reluctance to provide such an explanation usually stems from the belief that judges
might have to disclose on the record matters that are private or potentially embarrassing. We
believe that in most instances this concern is unfounded. First, if a private or potentially
embarrassing matter is the basis for the disqualification motion, it will already be set forth in the
motion, which is a public document. Second, in such a situation, it would be prudent for the
judge, who is in the best position to know about the private or potentially embarrassing facts, to
have disqualified himself or herself voluntarily in the first instance, thereby obviating the need
for the filing of a motion.
The requirement for an explanation only applies to disqualification motions that are
denied. If the judge grants such a motion, or disqualifies himself or herself voluntarily, no
explanation is necessary. In such instances, it properly remains within the discretion of the judge
whether to provide an explanation in a written opInon or on the record, and we anticipate that
judges would only do so where the explanation would hie 1future value to the judiciary and the
bar. Proposed language summarizing these principles has been suggested as a new Comment 8.
With the addition of new Rule. 2. 11(C), former Rule 2.1 1(C) would be redesignated as
Rule 2.1 1(D) but without ny change to the language.
Rule 3.2 Appearances before Governmental Bodies
and Consultation with Government Officials
Amendment to Text
1 A judge shall not appear voluntarily at a public hearing before, or otherwise consult with, an
2 executive or a legislative body or official, except:
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(A) in connection with matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration
ofjustice, including a hearing to confinn, or assess the judge's qualifications for, appointment to
another judicial office or govermnn tal position;
(B) in connection with matters about which the judge acquired knowledge or expertise in
the course of the judge's judicial duties; or
(C) when the judge is acting pro se in a matter involving the judge's legal or economic
interests, or when the judge is acting in a fiduciary* capacity.
Amendments to ComnmentarV
None proposed.
Explanation of Proposed Change
This proposed revision is intended to clarify that a judge's appearance at a confirmation
hearing or a hearing to assess the judge's qualifications for appointment to another judicial office
or governmental post is not prohibited.
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Rule 3.4 Appointment to Governmental Positions
Amendment to Text
1 A judge shall not accept appointment, simultaneous with serv i as a jdge, to a governmental
2 committee, board, commission, or other governmental position, unless it is one that concerns the
3 law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.
Amendment to Commeintarv
None proposed.
Explanation of Proposed Chan e
This proposed revision makes the very commonsense carification that the prohibition on
accepting appointment to a governmental position applies only where service in the
governmental position would be simultaneous with service as a judge. Nothing should prohibit a
sitting judge from accepting a governmental position that will commence after the judge's
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